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Abstract: This paper aims to make a contribution to the existing devolution literature by developing a conceptual framework 
that draws together many of the insights that have emerged within case study research. Combining concepts found in the 
literatures on political legitimacy, nationalism, and social movements with intuitions derived from veto player theory, it provides 
a structured and theoretically-grounded framework of devolution decisions and non-decisions. By applying this framework to the 
Scottish  case,  the  merits  of  such  an  approach  are  illustrated.  It  will  be  argued  that  territorially-concentrated  legitimacy 
grievances,, along with pre-existing meso level mobilisation structures, played an important role in creating popular support for 
devolution amongst the Scottish electorate. The number of veto players and the policy position of the agenda-setter are shown to 
have influenced the degree to which this popular support translated into real policy change. Taken together, this offers a new 
perspective on the process of Scottish devolution.   
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Introduction  
The transfer of powers and resources downwards from the central state towards the meso level has 
been widespread in recent decades, especially within the European Union (Keating 1998; Rodriguez-Pose 
and Gill 2003). A large part of the literature on regionalism and devolution focuses on the economic and 
political effects of this trend (for example: Azfar, Kähkönen et al. 1999; Curtice 2001; Fisman and Gatti 2002; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire 2004; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2005). Much less systematic attention is paid to 
why countries devolve in the way that they do. Contributions that do address this important question tend to 
be detailed accounts of specific cases (for example: Conversi 1997; Giordano 2000; Keating 2000; Moreno 
2001; 2001a; 2001b; 2003). Within these analytical stories, a variety of factors, ranging from cultural, historic, 
linguistic and religious ties to economic variables and ideological beliefs, are commonly employed to explain 
the emergence or strengthening of support for devolution. Although the complex ways in which these 
factors  feed  into  each  other  are  discussed,  the  theoretical  nature  of  the  link  between  them  is  seldom 
explored. More specifically, little systematic attention is paid to the complex processes that lead from the 
mobilization of  regional legitimacy grievances to the actual devolution of powers and resources.  
This  paper  aims  to  address  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  developing  a  more  theoretically-founded 
explanation  of  the  devolution  process.  The  first  part  of  this  paper  will briefly  outline  this  framework. 
Section two then shows how this framework sheds new light on the process of Scottish devolution in recent 
decades.  It  will  be  argued  that  grievances  that  could  be  mobilised  in  support  of  devolution  had  been 
mounting in Scotland since the early 1960’s. Failure to frame the issues successfully, combined with the ill 
timing of the 1979 referendum, however prevented devolution from materialising.  During the 1980’s and 
90’s, the emergence of additional grievances along with a more successful mobilisation process increased the 
pressure from below towards greater Scottish autonomy.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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However, for more than a decade this pressure could not be translated into policy outcomes due to a lack of 
meso representational congruence during Conservative rule. The changed after Labour’s return to power in 
1997. The continued success of the Scottish National party (SNP), along with the strong electoral position 
of the party in Scotland, induced Labour to be more responsive to Scottish demands. The timing of the 
subsequent devolution referendum, shortly after the party’s convincing victory in the 1997 general elections, 
along with a more successful mobilisation process, contributed to the subsequent creation of a Scottish 
Parliament with limited tax-varying powers.      
Framework 
The research on devolution is notoriously plagued by the ‘many variables, few cases’ problem. Rather 
than reverting to a fairly descriptive study of the case at hand, this paper will respond to this challenge by 
awarding greater attention to the substantial quality of the proposed explanations. To do this, it will develop 
a conceptual framework of devolution by drawing on the a number of theoretical insights from literatures 
on political legitimacy, nationalism and social movements, alongside veto player theory. It is important to 
stress that this framework is used as an analytical tool, not as a longitudinal description of the process. 
Section two will show how this framework provides a structured explanation of devolution decisions and 
non-decisions by applying it to the Scottish case.  
In its most general form, popular support for a more devolved system of government emerges 
when, at least in certain policy areas, the Meso arena is perceived as a more legitimate or more capable 
representative  of  the  people  than  the  central  government.  In  other  words,  it  results  from  legitimacy 
grievances that are defined in a territorial way. Since the perceived legitimacy of any political arena generally 
depends on a number of factors, such grievances can also take different forms.  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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As popular discontent become more profound and different types of grievances start to coincide within one 
meso arena, the potential for popular support increases. This paper will loosely draw on the concepts of 
specific and diffuse support put forward by Easton (1965) to distinguish between these types of grievances. 
Specific support for a political arena depends on its perceived ability to produce outputs that meet, or can 
be expected to meet, the demands of enough of the members within some reasonable timeframe (Easton 
1965: 269). Dissatisfaction with the output the central arena is perceived to produce, as well as a belief that 
the meso arena would be able to produce more satisfactory outputs, creates grievances that can be mobilised 
in support of devolution.  In many cases, such output-based grievances are not the sole source of support 
for a more devolved system of governance. The perceived legitimacy of the meso arena as a locus of 
democratic representation generally also depends on a degree of diffuse support. This type of support is 
independent of short term government performance and forms a ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good 
will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they 
see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273).   
Diffuse support can in turn be divided into types. First of all, the ideology or articulated principles 
and values of a regime can impact on the perceived legitimacy of the arena (Easton 1965: 290). Although 
regional differences need not have an immediate effect, consistent discrepancies in ideological stances and 
partisan support may over time diminish the perceived legitimacy of the central arena in favour of meso 
level representation. Secondly, the structures and norms of a regime will influence its perceived legitimacy. 
Although their legitimacy can be linked to the legitimating ideology, some structural arrangements and 
norms may acquire a legitimacy of their own over time (Easton 1965: 300). When ideological beliefs change, 
old institutions may continue to enjoy a reasonable degree of legitimacy, at least as long as they produce 
outcomes that are not clearly in conflict with these new beliefs. Support for a more devolved system of 
governance is in itself a statement that the current structures and norms are viewed as deficient.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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This view may emerge when previously accepted institutional arrangements start to produce results that are 
perceived as going against the ideological preferences and material interests of the region. Thirdly, the 
perceived  characteristics  of  authority  figures  may  impact  on  the  legitimacy  of  a  political  arena.  Such 
individuals can draw their legitimacy from conformity to the legitimating ideology or structures and norms 
of a regime, but they can also be perceived as legitimate because the members of a system recognise them as 
being personally worthy of moral approval (Easton 1965: 303). As the authority figures in the central arena 
lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the regional electorate or as meso arena leaders with stronger credentials 
emerge, a more devolved system may seem more attractive.   
Finally, the legitimacy of a political arena as a locus of representation can also be based on the idea 
of a common interest or bond at this geographical scale. Easton (1965) does not link this common interest 
to a sense of regional or national identity. Instead he defines the concept more broadly as “a social sanction 
or norm to impel members to substitute for their own private or particular wants, a new or different one, 
that of a higher entity or ideal called the common good” (Easton 1965: 314-315). However, the sheer 
existence of regional or national feelings of belonging does often play an important role in legitimising 
governmental  policies,  in  particular  where  they  have  re-distributive  effects  (Miller  1995:  50-80).  In 
primordial  accounts  of  regional  or  national  attachments,  territorial  identities  are  seen  as  historically-
determined assumed ‘givens’ of social existence, based on kinship and religious, linguistic and cultural ties 
(Geertz 1963: 109). Most of the current literature on regionalism and nationalism however views identity as 
created or constructed around such ethnic, historic and cultural identifiers, rather than determined by them. 
In this view, identity is “neither determined rigidly by the past or by rooted social values, nor entirely open 
for invention and manipulation in the present” (Keating, Loughlin et al. 2003: 35).  
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The  existence  of  a  shared  identity  at  the  meso  level  does  not  necessarily  create  support  for  a 
territorialized government system. It does however offer an additional opportunity to legitimise claims for 
greater meso level autonomy. Through the emergence of the nation-state as the main form of political 
organisation, the existence of a shared territorial identity has become strongly linked to a normative right to 
self-determination (Moreno 2001: 101). The concept of the nation-state is build on the assumption that 
territorial identities are exclusive. In other words, nationality not only binds ‘us’ together, but distinguishes 
the group from ‘others’ that are not  like ‘us’ (Triandafyllidou 1998). The increasing importance of sub- and 
supranational
2 forms of political organisation has challenged this concept. As the Moreno question
3 shows, 
meso arena identity can be combined with identities at other geographical scales. The concepts of what 
constitutes  ‘us’  and  the  ‘other’  then  become  context-specific.  A  meso  identity  can  be  mobilised  as  a 
devolutionary force by presenting it as irreconcilable with the central identity in some aspects or policy 
terrains. Moreno (2001: 94) dubs this the mobilisation of a ‘differential fact’. Identity markers and other 
territorial legitimacy grievances then are not just or even mainly important because they reinforce the sense 
of a meso level ‘us’, but rather because they can be mobilised to strengthen the perception of a central arena 
‘other’ that is irreconcilable with the meso ‘us’ in some way.    
The legitimacy grievances described above do not automatically translate into popular support for 
devolution.  First  of  all,  a  first  order  preference  for  a  more  devolved  system  of  governance  need  not 
necessarily lead to a second order policy preference for devolution.  
 
                                                 
2 The lack of an identity-neutral word to denote political forms of organisation at spatial scales that are smaller or larger than 
the state exemplifies the tendency to equate the state with the nation.  
3 The Moreno question (1988), developed in 1986, asks respondents to place themselves on a five-point scale ranging from 
‘meso identity X, not country identity Y’ to  ‘country identity Y, not meso identity X.’.  In between these two extremes, three 
options that constitute some form of dual identity are given; ‘more X than Y’, ‘equally X and Y’, and ‘more Y than X’ . 
  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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Under conditions of perfect information, the electorate could effortlessly link their first order conceptions 
of the good society with the policy options that would aid the creation of such a society (Hindmoor 2005). 
However, in the presence of uncertainty about the ultimate effects of a policy, such a link may be more 
difficult to establish. Although a first-order preference for devolution may exist, fears that devolution may 
lead to more far-reaching deviations from the status-quo or conversely stabilise the process at a lower level 
of decentralisation may induce people to oppose it  (for an example of such effects see Dardanelli 2005). In 
addition, key players, such as interest groups, political parties and the media, affect the way issues are framed 
and translated into first and second order preferences. Potential legitimacy grievances need not be politicised 
along territorial  lines.  As discussed  above, a  meso  level  identity does not have to lead to demands  to 
reorganise  the  governmental  structure  of  a  state  along  territorial  lines.  Similarly,  discontentment  with 
government output or the ideology, structures and authority figures at the central level are rarely inherently 
spatial. Although legitimacy grievances that are more strongly spatially concentrated may more easily lend 
themselves for territorial mobilisation, elites can, to a degree, choose how they frame such issues. For 
instance, high unemployment rates in a rural area can be framed as a rural-urban issue, a general class 
problem or a region-specific territorial grievance. Groups that seek to mobilise support for devolution 
choose  to  couch  grievances  in a  territorial discourse,  rather  than  around other possible  dimensions  of 
political conflict.  
Different  societal  groups,  such  as  political  parties,  mass  media,  religious  movements  and  trade 
unions,  can  form  the  collective  vehicles  through  which  legitimacy  grievances  are  mobilised  (McAdam, 
McCarthy et al. 1996: 3). Whether such groups are successful at mobilising support for devolution will 
depend on the effectiveness of their communication method. In part this will be a function of the resources 
available to them: more established organisations, with more elaborate resources and numerous information 
outlets seem more likely to be successful than newly established organisations with little or no funding.  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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In addition, the ability of these groups to successfully frame issues will be crucial. They will need to make 
sure that their target audience will at a minimum “feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and 
optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem.” (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996: 5). In 
general, popular support for a more devolved system of governance will be easier to mobilise if central 
government grievances are both spatially concentrated and relatively widespread. In other words, if several 
types of grievances coincide within one meso arena, this enables interest groups to build richer and more 
convincing  pro-devolution  discourses.  In  addition,  it  will  be  easier  to  convince  the  public  that  these 
grievances could be alleviated through devolution if the meso arena enjoys a greater level of legitimacy.  In 
this  context,  especially  the  existence  of  a  shared  identity  or  value  system  is  often  awarded  great 
importance{Moreno, 2001 #86}.  
The degree to which these groups can influence the eventual policy outcome depends both on their 
own position in the political system and the identity of the other players. If these collectives have direct 
access to the central political decision-making process and, at times, play a pivotal role in decision-making, 
their views will have a more direct impact on the policy outcome. But even if regional actors do not occupy 
formal veto positions, they may be able to influence the eventual outcome. If we assume that veto players, at 
least to a degree, behave as vote-maximisers, interest groups may affect their positions by influencing the 
policy position of the meso arena median voter. The degree to which this effect takes place will depend on 
the meso representational congruence of the main veto players. This congruence is likely to be highest 
within players that derive most of their support from one specific meso arena. However, central level 
players  may  also  display  relatively  strong  meso  representational  congruence.  Especially  when  regional 
political parties form a real or perceived threat to electoral success, central level parties may be willing to 
accommodate the views of the meso level electorate.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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In addition, players may choose to devolve powers in policy areas when they feel that meso arena players are 
more likely to share their policy preferences than competing central arena players. In this case, devolution 
becomes a strategy for insulating certain policies from changes in partisan power at the central level.  
Whether the preference for devolution of one veto player will result in an actual change from the 
status quo will depend on a number of factors. In general terms, veto player theory predicts that, ceteris 
paribus, political stability increases with the number of veto players, the difference in their political positions 
and  the  internal  cohesion  of  each  of  them  (Tsebelis  2002).  These  statements  alone  can  however  not 
adequately answer our question, as they only identify the potential for overall change. Whether devolution 
occurs will be dependent on the preferences of the relevant veto players and the identity of the agenda 
setter. If a pro-devolution  player is the sole veto player in the system, devolution will occur. However, if the 
system has several veto players, the outcome will also depend on the position of other players and their 
internal cohesion. In such instances, the player with agenda setting power has a distinct advantage over the 
other players, as he can choose the solution in the winset of the status quo that is closest to his preferences.  
If agenda setting power lies with a pro-devolution party, devolution is therefore more likely to occur. This 
agenda setting power may be of particular importance when the electorate potentially has veto powers 
through a referendum (Tsebelis 2002: 133-134). In this case, a pro-devolution agenda setter may seek to 
tweak the question and timing of the referendum in such a way as to maximise public support. Anti-
devolutionist players on the other hand, will be inclined to do the opposite.                THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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The Scottish case  
The framework of devolution presented above stressed the role of territorial legitimacy grievances, 
along with meso-level mobilisation structures, in creating popular support for devolution. Whether popular 
support indeed leads to actual devolution is argued to be greatly dependent on the political system. The 
number of veto players in a system and the meso representational congruence of each of them is proposed 
to influence the substance and timing of devolutionary change. The remainder of this paper will employ this 
framework to shed new light of the process of devolution to Scotland in recent decades. It will commence 
by  examining  the  potential  sources  of  territorial  legitimacy  grievances,  before  turning  to  how  such 
grievances translated into support for devolution and actual policy outcomes.   
 
Potential legitimacy grievances  
 
When  exploring  the  origins  of  popular  support  for  devolution  in  Scotland,  several  commentators  
devote great attention to the emergence of Scotland as a kingdom during the ninth and tenth century, its 
troubled relationship with the English and the French, and the creation of a formal Union with England in 
1707(for example Munro 1999; Tomaney 2000; Keating 2001a).  In a society that is distinctly heterogeneous 
in cultural, religious and linguistic terms, this shared history of statehood indeed constitutes one of the most 
potent markers around which the Scottish sense of identity is build. Nationalist movements drew upon 
these images of early Scottish statehood and battles against foreign domination, not only to create as sense 
of a Scottish ‘us’, but also to reinforce the idea of the English as the ‘other’. From the 1980s onwards, 
cultural markers were increasingly mobilised alongside this image of Scotland as a stateless nation within a 
‘foreign’ state.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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Although historically Scotland harbours diverse cultures, with Celtic and Gaelic traditions in the Highlands 
and an Anglo-Saxon culture in the Lowlands, shared traditions and images have started to emerge (Keating 
2001a: 231). These cultural identifiers provide images and symbols that can instil a sense of a shared cultural 
heritage and help to distinguish it from the British identity . Throughout the past decades, a sense of 
Scottish identity has been widespread. When forced to choose between the two attachments, the majority of 
the people living in Scotland see themselves as Scottish rather than British.   
 
Table 1 Identity  (forced choice, column per cent) 

























Sample Size  1175  729  957  882 
Source: own elaboration based on Scottish Election Survey 1974,1979,1992,1997 
 
However, feelings of territorial identity need not be exclusive; to feel Scottish does not necessarily 
mean not to feel British. The extend to which the Scottish identity is seen as reconcilable with Britishness is 
likely to influence whether such feelings of belonging translate into support for devolution. The Moreno 
question (1988)  seem to offer an  opportunity to test this hypothesis. Table 2 shows that,  support for 
devolution or independence is indeed correlated with the strength of the Scottish sense of identity vis-à-vis 
Brittish feelings of belonging. Of those indicating independence as their first constitutional preference for 
the government of Scotland, 80 percent placed their Scottish identity above feelings of attachments towards 
Britain. By comparison, only 62 percent of those favouring some form of devolution and 35 percent of 
those in favour of maintaining the status quo indicated they felt more or exclusively Scottish.   THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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Table 2 Feelings of identity by constitutional preference (column per cent) 
  Independence  Devolution  Status Quo 
 









More  Scottish  than 
British 
 
41  43  25 
 
Equally  Scottish  and 
British 
 
14  17  45 
 
More  British  than 
Scottish 
 
2  4  8 
 
British not Scottish 
 
1  4  5 
Sample size  221  436  145 
Source: own elaboration based on Scottish Election Survey 1997. ‘Independence’ groups together ‘Independence, 
separate’ and ‘Independence in EU’, Devolution groups together ‘Elected body in UK, with tax-raising’ and ‘Elected 
body in UK, no tax-raising’, ‘Status quo’ refers to ‘No elected body’.    
 
Using the Moreno question to gauge the effects of identity on support for devolution may however be 
problematic. Considering the strong normative power given to identity in legitimising claims for territorial 
autonomy, a respondent’s constitutional preference is likely to influence the way he chooses to express his 
identity. In other words, Moreno’s identity scale may in fact not only be measuring the respondent’s feelings 
of attachment to different territorial units, but also the support for devolution we are trying to explain. 
Research based on this question is therefore likely to overestimate the effect of identity on constitutional 
preferences. Despite this potential bias, we still find that a sense of Scottish identity is not a necessary 
condition for support for devolution.  
 S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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The Scottish Election Survey (1997) shows that, of those who described themselves as ‘British not Scottish’, 
18 per cent voted in favour of the creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers in the 1997 
referendum,  while  13  percent  voted  in  favour  of  a  Parliament  without  such  powers.  This  is  a  strong 
indication that we need to look beyond identity issues to understand the origins of support for devolution.  
Alongside the salience of Scottish feelings of identity, economic factors are often used to explain the 
emergence of support for Scottish devolution (Keating and Loughlin 1996; Brown, McCrone et al. 1998; 
Dardanelli 2005). From its creation in 1707, the economic benefits related to increased market access and 
free trade were seen as the main sources of support for the Union within Scotland. The economies of scale 
necessary for profitable production in most modern sectors of industry emphasised the importance  of 
factors, especially considering Scotland’s low population density (McCrone 1993). In the post-war period, 
the continued decline of the traditional industries and the profound effect this had on the Scottish economy, 
did create the potential for legitimacy grievances. However, the creation of a more comprehensive welfare 
state system and active policies of economic development assistance suppressed this potential. In line with 
Keynesian economic management concepts, regional policies were employed to attempt to divert a number 
of  major  public  and  private  investments  to  Scotland.  Simultaneously  employment  rates  and  earnings 
improved. Although it is questionable to what extent these trends can  be attributed to regional policy 
(McCrone 1985; Brown 1989; Paterson 1994), the coincidence of more favourable economic circumstances 
with highly visible regional development policies did diminish the potential for output-based grievances.  
The  discovery of North Sea oil off the Scottish coast and the 1973 oil crisis temporarily increased the 
perceived viability of an independent Scotland. As the price of oil quadrupled, the central  government 
decided to impose additional taxes on oil companies, accumulating to approximately 90% of the additional 
revenues. The Scottish National Party mobilised this issue with considerable success, by arguing that an 
independent Scotland could now turn ‘poor Britons’ into ‘rich Scots’ (Keating 2001a: 214).  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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However, while the crisis stressed the potential revenues the North Sea oil could bring, it also exposed 
Scotland’s weak economic structure. The surge in oil prices led to a further downturn in the heavy industries 
that Scotland so strongly relied upon. This resulted in a dramatic decrease in manufacturing output and 
significant job losses (Aitken 1992). Simultaneously, the international capital mobility that accompanied 
globalization and European integration made interventionist regional policies seem less attractive to central 
governments (Cheshire and Gordon 1998).  The phasing-out of this type of intervention, combined with a 
severe recession, created fertile soil for the emergence of economic grievances. Especially during the 1979 to 
1997 period of Conservative rule, the macro-economic policies of the central government were increasingly 
seen as geared towards the needs of the south of England, to the detriment of the Scottish economy. 
Although  this  argument  held  some  truth  in  the  70s  and  80s,  as  industry  structures,  earnings  and 
unemployment  rates  started  to  approach  the  UK  average,  its  validity  may  have  diminished  somewhat. 
However, surveys show that the idea continued to resonate with the Scottish people (Keating 2001a: 214). 
In summary, regionally-concentrated economic problems, coinciding with a turn away from Keynesian 
regional development assistance, along with macro-economic policies that were seen to favour the South-
east of England to the detriment of Scotland, created sharp output-based legitimacy grievances during the 
1980s and early 90’s. Over the same period, political parties favouring a more autonomous Scotland and 
other pro-devolution interest groups argued that, in the face of increased European integration, a devolved 
or even independent Scotland would now be both viable and economically advantageous (Brown, McCrone 
et al. 1998: 22-23; Keating 2001a: 217-8). It remains unclear to what extend these arguments also resonated 
with the Scottish public. Especially in the more peripheral areas of Scotland, concerns over the effects of the 
single market and other EU policies on agriculture and fisheries seemed to continue to dominate public 
opinion (Keating 2001a: 229).   S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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In addition, the 1997 Scottish Election Survey casts doubts on the degree to which beliefs about the effects 
of European integration alone impact upon support for devolution or independence. As table 3 shows, the 
percentage of the respondents favouring the different constitutional options did not differ substantially 
according to the perception on the effect of European integration on Scotland.    
 
Table 3 Constitutional preferences according to the perceived effect of the European Union on 
Scotland (column per cent) 
   
Good for Scotland 
 




















































Sample size  350  178  167  185 
Source: own elaboration based on Scottish Election Survey 1997, ‘Independence’ groups together ‘Independence, 
separate’ and ‘Independence in EU’, Devolution groups together ‘Elected body in UK, with tax-raising’ and ‘Elected 
body in UK, no tax-raising’, ‘Status quo’ refers to ‘No elected body’.  
 
Regardless  of  the  impact  of  European  integration,  interest  groups,  and  specifically  the  Scottish 
National Party, did manage to raise considerable doubts about the economic benefits of Union to Scotland. 
Creatively using data provided by the Conservative Treasury Chief Secretary, William Waldegrave, the SNP 
famously argued that even the central government  had to admit that Scotland was a contributor rather than 
a net recipient of public funds over the period from 1979 to 1997 (Brown, McCrone et al. 1998: 93; Wilson 
2003).  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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Although central government publications consistently refuted this claim (Scottish Office 1992; 1995; 1996; 
1997; 1998; Scottish Executive 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005), it did effectively challenge the 
view that Scotland was heavily subsidised. In addition, the Barnett formula, introduced in the late 1970’s, 
slowly decreased any favourable expenditure position that existed.(Collier and Hoeffler 2002)   
Output-based grievances, along with the insistence of opposition parties that alternative economic 
policies were both viable and more advantageous for Scotland, fuelled popular discontent with the general 
ideological stance of the central government. In the post-war period, Scottish support for the party that won 
the general elections has long been fairly similar to the UK average. However, in 1970 and throughout the 
period from  1979 to 1997, significant  differences in  voting  behaviour  emerged.  While  overall  electoral 
support for the governing party was above 40 per cent, Scottish support in these five general elections was 
markedly lower, ranging from 38 per cent in 1970 to a low of 24 per cent in 1987. S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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Figure 1 Electoral support for the government party in Scotland and the UK  1945-2005  
 
Source: own elaboration based on Leeke ( 2003) 
 
Due to the decline of support for the Conservative Party from the 1950’s onwards and the resulting 
ideological  grievances  during  the  prolonged  period  of  Conservative  rule,  the  Scottish  people  are  often 
claimed to be more left-wing than the UK as a whole (Keating 2001a: 215; McLean 2004). British Social 
Attitudes Surveys show that the Scottish electorate indeed tends to espouse values to the left of the British 
average (Curtice 1988; Curtice 1992; Curtice 1996; Brown 1998). However, differences are usually found to 
be too small to adequately explain the large disparities in voting behaviour, especially after correcting for 
regional variation in socio-structural factors (Miller, Timpson et al. 1996; Brown, McCrone et al. 1998: 164).  
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The steady decline in Scottish support for the Conservative Party therefore also seems to be related to 
the  way  in  which  first-order  conceptions  of  the  ‘good  society’  are  translated  into  second  order  policy 
preferences  and  third  order  partisan  alignments.  Partly,  this  trend  can  be  linked  to  the  increasing 
secularisation of social and political life. Up to the 1960’s, religious beliefs and party loyalties had been more 
strongly associated in Scotland that in the rest of Britain, with Scottish protestants of all classes displaying a 
stronger  loyalty  to  the  Conservative  Party  than  their  English  counterparts.  As  religious  denominations 
became less important markers of partisan identification, a significant part of the protestant working class 
electorate moved away from the Conservative Party towards Labour and the SNP (Brown, McCrone et al. 
1998: Chapter 6 and 7). In addition, the Scottish electorate as a whole was more sceptical about the free-
market  philosophy  of  Thatcherism  and  its  ability  to  deliver  the  desired  social  and  economic  results. 
Especially in the middle class, support for the Conservative Party decreased rapidly from the early 80’s 
onwards, to the advantage of the Liberal Democrats, Labour and the SNP (Brown, McCrone et al. 1998: 
155, Scottish Election Survey 1979, 1992, 1997). On average, such a shift was not noticeable in Britain, 
where both the skilled working class and the middle class trusted free-market policies and the Conservative 
Party to provide many of the same social and economic goals (British Election survey 1979, 1992).  
Regardless of the validity of the image of the Scottish people as ideologically distinct from the rest of 
the UK, this type of argumentation did aid the mobilisation of low electoral support for the governing party 
along territorial lines. Within the rest of Great Britain, electoral support for the Conservatives also varied, 
with the Party consistently enjoy relatively low levels of support in many constituencies in the north and 
west of Britain (Johnston, Pattie et al. 1988; Curtice 1996).  However, in the absence of strong regional 
mobilising structures and a sense of regional identity, the resulting ideological grievances were not mobilised 
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The effective translation of regionally-concentrated differences in electoral behaviour into constitutional 
concerns within Scotland, and to a lesser extent Wales, owes much to a pre-existing sense of the region as a 
distinct social, cultural and economic entity. Established meso-level elites and institutions, who had an 
incentive to frame conflicts in territorial terms, along with an already widespread sense of a shared interest 
and identity, created a more fertile environment for the territorial mobilisation of ideological grievances. 
This  mobilising  potential  was  augmented  by  the  ability  of  Scottish  elites  and  opposition  parties  to 
successfully frame regional divergence in voting behaviour as an expression of a distinct Scottish identity 
with specific social values, which were irreconcilable with the values that seemed to dominate in England 
(McEwen 2002: 77).  In other words, equating the Scottish identity with the values of justice and equality, 
helped to frame ideological grievances as identity-related issues that could only be solved through self-
determination.  
Especially when Thatcherism started to infringe upon the policy areas that were seen as central to this 
Scottish identity, such as health and education, these ideological grievances started to effect the perceived 
legitimacy of the established system of Scottish government (Brown, McCrone et al. 1998: 22). In the face 
of highly divergent voting patterns, many of the structures that were initially created to diminish Scottish 
discontent and reduce the political salience of regionalism, could no longer successfully fulfil these roles 
(Keating 2001a: 207). One of the most poignant examples of this is the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Although appointed by the governing party, the Secretary was widely seen as representing the Scottish 
interests in Westminster as well as the central government in Scotland. However, as voting patterns started 
to diverge, the Secretary of State lost his ability to act as a mediator and was increasingly perceived as a 
central  government  consul  to  Scotland,  rather  than  an  advocate  of  Scottish  interests  at  Westminster 
(Keating 2001a: 204-216).  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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Structural grievances were further aggravated by Thatcher’s emphasis on reducing the amount of Quasi-
Autonomous  Non  Governmental  Organisations  or  ‘quangos’.  Although  quangos  were  a  UK-wide 
phenomenon, their mediating role between the Scottish civil society and the central government made them 
of particular importance in Scotland. Although always unelected, quangos like the Health Boards were 
widely regarded to represent the views of the local people. As the Conservative government increasingly 
challenged their right of existence and independence, this function became strained (Brown, McCrone et al. 
1998: 101-104).  
  In  summary,  discontent  with  the  perceived  output  of  central  government  policies,  along  with 
regional  divergence  in  ideological  stances and  the increasing  illegitimacy  of  the prevailing structures  of 
formal  and  informal  Scottish  representation  created  territorially-concentrated  feelings  of  dissatisfaction. 
Over her long period of party leadership, Margaret Thatcher came to personify this myriad of grievances. By 
1989, only 10 percent of Scots felt she had Scotland’s interest at heart, while a strong majority agreed that 
she treated Scottish people as second-class citizens (Denver 2000: 38). Furthermore,  a large part of the 
Scottish electorate saw her as ‘extreme’ and ‘uncaring’ (Scottish election survey 1987). Around the time of 
the 1992 general elections, her successor, John Major, performed considerably better on all these aspects 
(Denver 2000: 38, Scottish election survey 1992 ). Perhaps this more positive perception of the personal 
characteristics  of  the  party  leader,  along  with  the  election  promise  to  look  at  the  Scottish  situation, 
contributed to the slight increase in Scottish support for the Conservative Party in 1992. However, any 
optimism about the Conservative stance on the Scottish issue quickly faded again after the implied potential 
for change did not materialise (Denver 2000: 38).        
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The Politics of devolution 
As the previous subsection shows, a combination of territorially-concentrated legitimacy grievances 
emerged from the 1950 onwards. A variety of interest groups played an important role in framing and 
mobilising  these  grievances.  From  as  early  as  1886,  single  issue  groups  like  the  Scottish  Home  Rule 
Association have tried to unite Scots of all political denominations behind the Home Rule issue (Mitchell 
1996: 68). In addition, important civic and religious organisations also supported the cause. Passing its first 
resolution in support of the policy in 1948, the Church of Scotland was one of  the earliest supporters of 
Scottish devolution(Highet 1960). Unlike its English counterparts, it was not shy to engage in public debate 
and criticise central government policy.  Publishing regular reports on the social and economic conditions in 
Scotland since the 1940’s, it also provided an important source of regional information that was not widely 
available at the time. Other groups that actively helped to mobilise grievances along territorial lines were 
trade unions, teachers organisations and local governments. Although initially sceptical about the benefits of 
devolution, the policies of the post-1979 Conservative governments united these organisations behind the 
home rule cause (Keating 2001a: 215). In addition, Scottish newspapers and television and radio stations 
reinforced the idea of a distinct Scottish cultural and economic reality and provided pro-devolution groups 
with a platform through which to spread their ideas (Denver 2000).  Alongside these important civil and 
religious groups, the Scottish National Party played an particularly important role in framing and mobilising 
Scottish legitimacy grievances.  
Although the constitutional status of Scotland received careful attention within the main British parties, 
it was rarely perceived as a key issue outside of general election and referenda campaigns. The SNP on the 
other hand actively sought to mobilise support for home rule on a continuous basis. Frustrated by the lack 
of  success  in  increasing  the  salience  of  the  issue  within  the  mainstream  parties,  home  rule  supporters 
founded the SNP after the First World War (Mitchell 1996).  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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Containing members from a range of political denominations, with divergent views on the ideal type of 
Scottish self-government and which strategy should be used to reach this, the party long lacked a clear party 
ideology. Rather it aimed to attract the vote of all those in favour of increased autonomy for Scotland, 
regardless of their position on the dominant left-right dimension of politics. Although by the time of the 
1974  general  election  the  party  manifesto  made  an  explicit reference  to  social  democracy  as  a  guiding 
principle for the party, uncertainty about its position on the left-right scale remained fairly widespread in the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s.  As support for the Tories in Scotland decreased across social classes and 
surveys showed that Scottish feelings of identity and support for home rule were generally stronger among 
the working class, the SNP moved more decisively to the left of the political spectrum (Keating 2001a: 213) 
By the early 1990s, the SNP had clearly become a left-wing party (Levy 1995).   
 
Table 4 Perceptions of those who voted for the SNP on the party’s position in relation to Labour 
and the Conservative (column per cent) 
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Sample size  283  132 
Source: own elaboration based on Scottish Election Surveys 1979, 1997 
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While  this  clearer  and  more  cohesive  left-wing  nationalist  agenda  helped  to  maintain  popular 
support for the party, it may have diminished its ability to influence government policy, at least during 
Conservative rule. From the late 1960’s to the mid 1970’s, the electoral appeal of the SNP had been a 
concern for Labour and the Conservatives alike. The increasing level of electoral support, along with a 
confused understanding of the type of voters the SNP was attracting, greatly amplified its ability to stimulate 
both parties to take a more devolutionary stance. A poignant example of SNP influence on the Conservative 
Party line was Edward Heath’s declaration in favour of a Scottish Assembly at the party’s annual conference 
in 1968. Coming as a surprise to both pro- and anti-devolution party members, it was regarded as a strategic 
response to the perceived electoral threat posed by the SNP (Denver 2000: 8). This reading seems to be 
confirmed by the fact that the policy was quickly abandoned when the Scottish National Party failed to 
attract the anticipated level of support during the 1970 general election. When Heath’s predictions did 
materialise in October of 1974, the Conservative Party was no longer in a credible position to respond, 
having failed to deliver change in the previous period in office. The subsequent move of the SNP towards 
the left of the political spectrum, combined with the continued decline in Conservative support in Scotland, 
soon made devolution a dimension of politics that was of little importance to the fate of the Conservative 
Party. Although small pro-devolution factions continued to exist within the party, it progressively moved 
towards a more centralist stance during the Thatcher years. 
Within the Labour Party on the other hand, the SNP’s self-positioning as a left-wing party had the 
opposite effect. Though offering early support to the idea of Scottish home rule, Labour had reverted to a 
more centralistic stance after the Second World War, as its core socialist values of equality and central 
economic management were increasingly perceived as at odds with stronger regional autonomy (Denver 
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When Scottish devolution initially returned to the forefront again in the October 1974 campaign, this was 
mainly a tactical response to the increased electoral success of the Scottish National Party (Keating 2001a: 
219).  During  the  long  period  of  Conservative  rule  that  followed,  the  party’s  policy  commitment  to 
devolution strengthened. The detrimental effects of the free-market philosophy in crucial policy areas, such 
as welfare, education and health provisions, coupled with the consistent electoral dominance of the Labour 
Party  in  Scotland,  made  devolution  seem  like  an  attractive  way  to  insulate  these  policy  areas  from 
Conservative rule in the future (Denver 2000).  However, the electoral success of the SNP continued to 
played  an  important  role  in  keeping  devolution  on  the  agenda.  Especially  when  the  party  leader  was 
personally unenthusiastic about devolution, as was reportedly the case with Tony Blair (Rentoul 1995: 287; 
Seldon 2004), the positioning of the SNP as a nationalist left-wing party helped to stress the importance of  
devolution in the battle for the Scottish vote.  
In  summary,  the  SNP’s  explicit  move  to  the  left  of  the  political  spectrum,  combined  with  the 
decrease  of  support  for  the  Conservative  greatly,  influenced  the  ultimate  impact  Scottish  support  for 
devolution  has  had  on  government  policy  over  the  past  decades.  When  the  Labour  Party  and  the 
Conservatives still enjoyed similar levels of support in Scotland and the SNP remained ambiguous  about its 
position  on  the  left-right  scale,  support  for  devolution  among  the  Scottish  electorate  had  a  moderate 
influence on both parties. However, as devolution increasingly became a left-wing issue, incentives to strive 
for Scottish representational congruence diverged. For the Labour Party, the great electoral potential of 
Scotland,  combined  with  the  threat  of  the  SNP,  created  stronger  pressures  to  accommodate  Scottish 
demands.  For  the  Conservative  Party,  this  framing  of  the  issue  removed  the  electoral  incentive  to 
accommodate Scottish demands and therefore encouraged a more centralistic stance.  
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The changing electoral incentive structure and the resulting divergence of policy positions created 
the conditions for the long period of policy stability during Conservative rule, followed by the rather abrupt 
devolutionary change shortly after Labour came to power in 1997. In general, the governmental system in 
the UK is quite conducive to more extensive policy change. Although it is strictly speaking bicameral, it can 
in many instances be seen as a system with a single institutional veto player, as the upper house rarely holds 
absolute veto power. Within the lower house, a single partisan player, the governing party, generally hold 
most of the agenda-setting and decision-making powers. However, when this party does not have an overall 
majority or its internal cohesion is low, additional veto players emerge, as the government needs to rely on 
support from members of other parties to pass legislation. Veto player theory predicts that, during such 
periods, political stability will increase, in the sense that a change from the status quo becomes less likely and 
any change that does occur is likely to be less substantial (Tsebelis 2002: 19-25). Drawing on this general 
theory of political stability, changes in the number of veto players and their policy positions over the last 50 
years can be seen as the main determinants of the timing of devolution to Scotland in recent decades. To 
illustrate this point, let us compare the failed 1979 devolution referendum, to the process that led to the 
acceptance of the Scotland Bill in 1998.  
In the decade before the 1979 referendum, Scottish devolution featured prominently on the political 
agenda. After a move towards more centralistic policy stances after the Second World War, the issue gained 
renewed salience due to the increasing electoral success of the SNP. In the context of intense electoral 
competition,  both  Labour  and  the  Conservatives  responded  by  devoting  greater  attention  to  Scottish 
demands (Keating and Bleiman 1979; Seawright 1999). However, the largely electoral motivation behind 
such commitments and the lack of widely carried support for devolution within both parties quickly became 
apparent. During the Conservative rule from 1970 to 1974, the issue received little attention and any real 
change failed to materialise (Denver 2000: 8).  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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When Labour came to power in the subsequent election, it make a strong commitment to the creation of a 
Scottish Assembly. However, Labour’s slender majority, which it soon lost after disappointing by-election 
results,  and  the  substantial  minority  of  Labour  MPs  that  opposed  the  policy,  made  it  difficult  for the 
government to fulfil these commitments.  
The narrow electoral victory, combined with the low level of cohesion within the party, awarded 
considerable powers to both anti-devolution factions within the government party and members of the 
opposition. After the fall of the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1977, it became blatantly clear that the Labour 
leadership would have to make serious concessions to the anti-devolutionist camp to get the policy through 
Parliament (Keating and Bleiman 1979: 176). Most importantly, Labour backbenchers and Conservative 
MPs managed to force the government to concede to a referendum on devolution, thereby awarding veto 
powers to the Scottish electorate. In 1978, the strength of these powers was further increased by the passing 
of the ‘Cunningham amendment’, which stipulated that at least 40 per cent of the eligible electorate had to 
vote in favour of the proposals in order for them to take effect, (Denver 2000: 16). The lengthy debates in 
Parliament and the resulting time-lag between the raising of the issue in 1974 and the eventual referendum 
in 1979 did not work in favour of the Labour Party leadership. Effectively having lost a large part of its 
agenda-setting powers to the Conservatives and its own backbenchers, the party leadership was forced to 
hold the referendum towards the end of a long and difficult period of rule, when popular support for the 
Labour Party was low. Given the influence of partisan attachments on voting behaviour in referenda (Pierce, 
Valen et al. 1983), a Labour proposal stood a relatively high chance of being defeated at this time.  
The veto powers of the public, along with the timing and decision-making rules of the referendum, 
made the passing of the Bill highly dependent on the effectiveness with which potential grievances were 
mobilised into popular support for devolution.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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In the 1970’s, discontent with the economic situation in Scotland and a shared history of statehood were the 
main factors that could underpin support for greater Scottish autonomy. In comparison to the situation in 
1997, when ideological, structural and personal grievances accompanied such output and identity-based 
factors, the pro-devolution interest groups had a rather limited range of grievances upon which to base their 
discourse.  In  addition,  attempts  to  mobilise  these  issues  were  notoriously  divergent  and  unorganised. 
Although a general ‘Yes for Scotland’  campaign was set up by the chair of the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution, Lord Kilbrandon, the Labour Party decided early on not to join this cross-party initiative. 
Arguing devolution should be presented as a final solution to the Scottish issue, the party leadership felt it 
should not join forces with groups who saw it as a step toward Scottish independence (Denver 2000: 18-20). 
Within the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, the campaigning strategy was large left up to the individual 
branches. As a result, some joined the overarching Yes Campaign, while others campaigned independently 
(Bochel and Denver 1981).  
The myriad of campaigning efforts on the pro-devolution side sent mixed messages about both the 
rational behind devolution and its ultimate outcome on the status of Scotland. Especially the resulting 
insecurity about whether devolution would ultimately lead to full independence may have hindered the 
translation  of  first  order  preferences  for  a  more  devolved  system  to  actual  support  for  devolution 
(Dardanelli  2005).  The  much  better  organised  and  funded  ‘Scotland  says  No’  campaign  managed  to 
successfully play on these anxieties. The Conservatives stressed that a rejection of the current proposal 
would  not  mean  the  end  of  the  devolution  project,  but  instead  offered  an  opportunity  to  resolve 
outstanding issues, such as the West Lothian Question and the Assembly’s resources and size (Macartney 
1981; Seawright 1999). In the face of a confusing Yes campaign, the argument that a No vote was not a vote 
against devolution, but rather a vote in favour of a more thoughtful and inclusive devolution process, may 
have carried considerable weight.  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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In the context, it is perhaps more remarkable that 51.6 per cent of voters still favoured the creation of a 
Scottish Assembly, than that the level of support fell short of the ’40 per cent of the eligible electorate’ 
threshold. (Denver 2000: 133).   
The return to power of the Conservative Party, after the ‘no confidence’ vote that followed the 
failed referendum brought down the Labour government, however did not bring the considered devolution 
alternative some may have hoped for. Under Thatcher’s leadership, the lack of real enthusiasm for the policy 
soon became apparent (Seawright 1999). The strong partisan belief in the sovereignty of parliament and the 
need to preserve the Union in its current state, sat as uneasy with Scottish devolution as it did with the 
European  integration  process  (Keating  2001a:  258).  In  addition,  leading  proponents  of  the  ‘new  right’ 
agenda  argued  that  laissez-faire  economic  policies,  privatisation,  and  deregulation  would  empower  the 
people directly, making devolution to regional governments no longer necessary (Bogdanor 1979: 112). 
Since the Conservative Party convincingly won the next three general elections, it had a firm grip on the 
agenda-setting powers in the lower house. As a result, the issue of devolution all but disappeared from the 
political agenda. It briefly re-emerged in the early 1990’s following John Major’s insistence on the subject 
during the 1992 campaign. Against the advice of the campaign managers, the new party leader had strongly 
emphasised the Conservative commitment to keeping Scotland within the Union, but also promised that the 
Conservative Party would look into the Scottish question should it come to power. However, the small 
symbolic  concessions  during  the  subsequent  period  of  Conservative  rule  could  not  hide  the  general 
unwillingness to accommodate Scottish demands for substantial devolution (Denver 2000: 38-39).      
During  this  long  period  of  opposition,  commitment  to  devolution  within  the  Labour  Party 
increased.  The growing legitimacy grievances in Scotland, along with the sustained support for the SNP and 
the emerging realisation that devolution could be partisan-utility increasing in certain policy areas, created 
stronger support for the policy.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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In addition, many prominent members of the party and most importantly the then party leader, John Smith, 
were personally committed to the policy and actively championed it within the party. After Smith’s untimely 
death, there was some speculation that Labour might drop the policy. The new party leader, Tony Blair, 
surprised  friend  and  foe  by  reaffirming  Labour’s  commitment  to  stronger  autonomy  for  Scotland  and 
Wales. In light of his sceptical attitude towards devolution, this decision was probably inspired by a desire to 
create support within the party and safeguarding important Scottish votes. In the context of the strong 
commitment to devolution of both his esteemed predecessor and his main leadership rival, Gordon Brown, 
supporting devolution presumably aided Blair’s leadership campaign and his perceived legitimacy as Smith’s 
successor. In addition, most expected Labour to gain only a narrow majority in the general elections at that 
time. The Scottish vote therefore was potentially pivotal to ensure electoral success.  
Although the party commitment to devolution remained, Blair did make one significant change to 
his predecessor’s plans; he made Scottish devolution dependent on the outcome of a two-question pre-
legislative referendum on the merits of a Scottish Parliament and tax-varying powers. Although the move 
created considerable controversy within the party, the commitment to a pre-legislative referendum seemed 
prudent at the time (Denver 2000: 42; Stuart 2005: 405). The likelihood of a relatively narrow victory in the 
general elections made a repeat of the scenario of the 1970’s a realistic option. In addition, the prospect of 
having to convince English Labour MP’s of the need to spend the first months of a long-awaited return to 
power debating devolution, rather than education, welfare and health, must have seemed unattractive (Stuart 
2005: 404). Committing to a referendum on devolution in the election campaign ensured the party remained 
in  control  over  the  timing  and  rules  of  the  referendum.  The  strong  emphasis  on  the  issue  by  the 
Conservatives presumably inspired the decision to commit to a separate question on the desirability of tax-
varying powers. In particular the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Forsyth, relentlessly 
attacked this aspect of the devolution plans.  THE PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION: THE SCOTTISH CASE 
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His coinage of this issue as the ‘tartan tax’ was particularly effective in  light of New Labour’s efforts to rid 
the party of its tax-raising image (Brown 1998: 33; Denver 2000: 42) 
In  hindsight,  a  referendum  may  not  have  been  necessary,  as  Labour  won  the  1997  more 
convincingly than anticipated. However, this stronger agenda-setting power, together with the increased 
Scottish discontent with the ideological stance of successive central governments and the effects this was 
perceived to have on the Scottish economy, did put the party leadership in a much better position to ensure 
a positive outcome. As we have seen, output-based grievances became more strongly linked to discontent 
with central government policies during Conservative rule. The divergence of Scottish voting behaviour 
from the country average, along with the centralistic stance of the government, created new ideological and 
structure-based grievances. The negative perception of Margaret Thatcher among a large part of the Scottish 
electorate reinforced these grievances. Especially in the context of a sense of Scottish identity that centred 
around the history of an independent Scottish state and its struggle against the English, this image of the 
central government as a defender of the English interests and values created stronger territorial framing 
opportunities than the primarily output-based grievances of the 1970’s. The translation of support for a 
more devolved system of governance into second order preferences for actual devolution was further aided 
by a decreased fear of full independence. While only 15 per cent favoured independence in 1979, 26 per cent 
indicated it as their preferred form of government for Scotland in 1997 (Scottish Election Survey 1979, 
1997). In addition, of those who supported devolution to a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers, 39 
per cent indicated independence as their second preference (Scottish Election Survey 1997).   
The  successful  identification  of  the  type  of  grievances  that  were  most  conducive  to  territorial 
mobilisation,  along  with  the  stronger  correlation  between  support  for  devolution  and  support  for 
independence, enabled the emergence of a much more effective and cohesive campaign in favour of the 
government’s proposals.  S.A.R. TIJMSTRA  
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Having learned from the 1979 experience,  preparations for a strong Yes campaign commenced soon after 
Labour announced its commitment to a devolution referendum in the run up to the 1997 elections. At the 
instigation of a Nigel Smith, a well-researched and independent inter-party campaign emerged (Denver 
2000: 51-57). The relatively limited involvement of the Constitutional Convention, along with Smith’s early 
efforts to include the SNP, made it possible to unite all three major pro-devolution parties behind the 
resulting ‘Scotland Forward’ campaign. The effectiveness of this united approach was further increased by 
the high level of attention that went into formulating the campaign message. Based on research by Peter 
Kellner (1996), the Yes campaign mainly stressed that devolution offered an opportunity to ensure that 
Scotland could assert its nationhood and defend its distinct identity and values. Combined with a much 
weaker campaign effort by the anti-devolution camp, this focus on ideological and identity-based grievances, 
rather than the economic effects of devolution, proved very effective.  
At a time when popular support for the government was high, the build-up of Scottish discontent 
during Conservative rule, together with a more thoughtful and united way of framing the issue, result in a 
resounding Yes on both referendum questions.  The creation of a Scottish Parliament was favoured by 74.3 
per cent of voters, while a further 63.5 per cent also supported tax-varying powers (Denver 2000: 133). This 
was enough to establish a strong mandate for the creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers. 
A strong government majority, in addition to the absence of a formal 40 per cent threshold, ensured a fairly 
smooth legislative process. Although small amendments were made, the result was a devolution of powers 
to Scotland that greatly resembled the government’s preferred option (Denver 2000: 189-191).  
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Conclusion 
This  paper  aimed  to  couch  the  intuitions  that  have  emerged  in  the  existing  literature  in  a  more 
theoretically-grounded framework of devolution. Linking devolution preferences to the perceived legitimacy 
of the meso and central arena, the framework draws on the concepts of specific and diffuse support to 
distinguish five types of grievances that can lay at the basis of popular support for the policy. As grievances 
become more profound and different types of discontent coincide within one meso arena, the potential for 
popular support for devolution increases. By mobilising and framing these grievances, existing and newly-
created mobilisation structures, such as political parties and civil and religious groups, play an important role 
in translating popular discontent into preferences for greater meso level autonomy. Whether a meso level 
preference for devolution affects central government policy will depend on the number of veto players, the 
level of meso representational congruence, and the identity of the agenda setter. By applying this framework 
to the Scottish case, this paper aimed to show that this approach can offer a structured and conceptual 
explanation of devolution decisions and non-decisions.  
In  the  Scottish  context,  the  existence  of  a  distinct  national  identity,  centred  around  a  history  of 
statehood  and  collective  struggle  against  the  threat  of  accession  by  the  English  and  the  French,  was 
identified as the basis for territorial mobilisation. In the post-war period, the decline of the traditional 
industries and the resulting increase in Scottish unemployment created the potential for additional output-
based  grievances.  Although  active  regional  policies  temporarily  soothed  this  source  of  discontent,  the 
discovery of North Sea oil enabled home rule groups like the SNP to mobilise this combination of identity 
and output-based grievances with considerable success. The subsequent electoral appeal of the Scottish 
National Party stimulated both Labour and the Conservatives to take a more devolutionary policy stance.  
However, the lack of real commitment in significant parts of the Labour Party and most of the Conservative 
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was dedicated to the policy, the slender majority in Parliament, along with significant opposition from the 
anti-devolutionist camp, made it difficult to achieve real change. Labour Backbenchers and Conservative 
MPs managed to force the Labour leadership to concede to a referendum. The addition of a new veto 
player, combined with the timing and decision-making rules of the referendum and a poor campaign effort 
prevented devolution from occurring.    
During the long period of Conservative rule that followed, Scottish discontent with the system steadily 
increased. The regional concentration of unemployment and economic hardship, combined with a turn away 
from Keynesian regional development assistance, created sharp output-based legitimacy grievances during 
the 1980s and early 1990’s. Over this period, the divergence of Scottish voting patterns from the British 
average, along with the insistence of opposition parties that alternative economic policies were both viable 
and  more  advantageous  for  Scotland,  further  increased  popular  discontent  with  the  general  ideological 
stance of the central government. In the context of a widely felt Scottish sense of identity, interest groups 
managed to mobilise these interlinked ideological and output-based grievances along territorial lines. As a 
result, popular support for devolution grew substantially. However, due to the strong concentration of 
powers in the UK government system and the low level of meso representational congruence within the 
Conservative Party, Scottish demands had no real influence on central government policy until Labour 
returned  to  power  in  1997.  Although  devolution  was  again  dependent  on  the  outcome  of  a  public 
referendum, this time much stronger agenda-setting powers, together with increased popular discontent 
with  the  current  system,  put  the  party  leadership  in  a  better  position  to  ensure  a  positive  outcome. 
Combined  with  a  more  unified  and  comprehensive  pro-devolution  campaign,  this  finally  ensured  the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers. 
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